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Personal Injury Damage Arguments
JAMES W. PAYNE, JR.
This brief comment deals only with one facet of Certified
T. V. c& Appliance Co., Inc. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109
S.E. 2d 126 (1959). The plaintiff brought an action for per-
sonal injuries. In summation plaintiff's attorney listed on a
blackboard and exhibited to the jury the following items
bearing on the question of damages:
Dr. Shoenfeld's bill of $40.00, Dr. Vann's bill of
$110.00, Dr. Alpert's bill of $255.00, Mrs. Gibbon's bill of
$280.00, past and future hospitalization ($1,200.00),
$463.00; crutches, stockings $36.98; future medical $1,-
000.00, permanent phlebitis $4,475.00, traumatic arthritis
at 50 cents-$5,475.00, mental anguish, re: Pregnancy,
five months-$750.00, seven weeks on crutches at $10.00
daily-$490.00, inability to wear shoes, dance et cetera-
$5,000.00, 20 percent permanent disability -$10,000.00--
making a total of $29,374.98. Record No. 4955, pp. 83, 84.
The jury gave the plaintiff a verdict for $12,500. The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded holding that the use of the
blackboard in the manner noted was reversible error. Why?
Certainly the court did not hold that the use of the black-
board in making computations before the jury or for the pur-
pose of diagramming or for other illustrative purposes was,
per se, wrong. The court states as much and the propriety of
such practice, in the discretion of the court, seems fairly well
settled. 201 Va. 109, 115, 109 S.E. 2d 126, 131. McCormick,
Evidence §180 (1954). What the court condemned is a
method of computing damages noted in the following lan-
guage:
The suggested amount for permanent phlebitis is the
sum of $5,475.00, and, while the record does not show how
counsel arrived at that figure, it can be assumed that it
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was fixed by calculating so many days of ailment at 50
cents per day, since the next item listed is traumatic
arthritis at 50 cents-5,475.00. The next items, mental
anguish, re: pregnancy, five months-$750.00, seven
weeks on crutches at $10.00 per day--$490.00, and in-
ability to wear shoes, dance, etc.-$5,000.00, appear to
have been calculated on a basis of a fixed amount to be
allowed each day for so many days. The last item of 20
percent total disability-$10,000.00 would appear to have
been suggested by counsel and calculated on the plain-
tiff's life expectancy. 201 Va. 109, 114, 109 S.E. 2d 126,
130.
At the outset, it might be noted that the court's decision
as to the damages claimed for permanent phlebitis, traumatic
arthritis, or 20 percent total disability, or, perhaps, "inability
to wear shoes, dance, et cetera" might be supported on the
basis that the claims overlapped or that there was no evidence
as to the life expectancy of the plaintiff-a factor which might
have been rendered considerably less speculative in nature
by reference to mortality tables supplemented by medical tes-
timony. The record does not disclose any such testimony and
the appellant's brief in the case states that such testimony
was never offered. Record No. 4955, Brief of Appellant, p.
31. The court might well adopt a rule requiring this evidence,
where feasible and relevant, as a condition to permitting per
diem calculations as to damages in counsel's summation.
Per diem calculations are speculative in at least two respects:
1. The time span to be covered in determining compensation.
2. The amount to be awarded per unit of time. If evidence as
to life expectancy would be relevant, depending on the nature
of the damages shown, and there is no showing of unavailabil-
ity, the court might well insist on testimony concerning this
point as a means of relieving the problem of uncertainty as to
time by way of establishing a proper foundation for per diem
damage calculations or arguments. Otherwise, it might, with
force, be said that counsel is assuming and arguing facts as to
which there is no evidence. However, the Virginia court in the
Harringion case hands down a blanket indictment against
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counsel's suggesting or arguing to the jury "an amount to be
allowed for pain, suffering, mental anguish and disability cal-
culated on a daily or other fixed basis .... " 201 Va. 109, 114,
115, 109 S. E. 2d 126, 131.
What are the counts in this indictment?
1. The method amounts to speculation by the lawyer un-
supported by evidence. Id. at 115, 109 S.E. 2d 126, 130. The
court notes:
It has been repeatedly held in Virginia and in other
jurisdictions that there is no fixed rule or yardstick by
which to measure with mathematical precision the defi-
nite amount of damages for physical pain, suffering and
mental anguish endured in personal injury cases. It is
within the sound discretion of the jury to determine what
is fair and reasonable compensation, and a verdict of the
jury will not be disturbed unless it appears that it was
influenced by partiality, prejudice, corruption of the
jury, or by some mistaken view of the evidence. Id. at 114.
It is difficult for this writer to see how the measure of dam-
ages could be rendered more speculative than by a rule stat-
ing that there is no rule by which damages may be measured
except the conscience of a jury empowered to operate within
far-ranging limits. It is equally difficult to believe that there
is a proper mathematical figure hovering over the courtroom
like a "brooding omnipresence in the sky" which the jury,
through some cabalistic process, can haul down and apply
fairly in an average of cases over any substantial period of
time. The very fact that the damage problem is so speculative
here is an argument and, it seems, a strong one in favor of
permitting counsel to argue the issue of damages on a per
diem or some other fixed basis. This procedure carries with it
the virtue or merit of reducing a hopelessly nebulous figure
to manageable units of time-manageable in the sense that
they are small enough to convey a realistic picture of the in-
juries sustained in a given case. If intelligent recognition of
the nature and extent of the injuries involved in a given case
PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGE ARGUMENTS 233
is desirable, there is reason to suggest a significant difference
between the picture conveyed to the jury when they are
simply told that P has lost a leg, or that P has lost a leg and
has a life expectancy of 40 years, and the picture conveyed
when the jury, in the same case, is informed of the daily diffi-
culties involved in such an injury and asked to compensate
on this basis. The latter procedure suggests a method of com-
pensation that is perhaps more realistic and perceptive in
operation than no method at all and since, in this kind of dis-
ability case, the difficulties experienced by P may be experi-
enced from day to day it is difficult to see clearly any consid-
erable wickedness involved in arguing for this means of
compensation in such a case
It is admittedly true that any such method of computing
damages is speculative. The writer is simply urging here that
less speculation is involved than when the jury is told that
there is no method of calculation or when no method is sug-
gested to them. It is also true that a per diem or fixed basis
for determining damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish,
or disability may be deceptive when counsel argues for the
award of a fixed amount per unit of time. This is true because
the full impact of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff is apt
to diminish with time. Conceivably, in many cases, however,
these injuries might become much more serious with the pass-
age of time. The extent of psychological or physical harm
done is also apt to vary with the personality, age, sex, and
occupation of the injured party. If this is true, it is perhaps
also true that the deception involved will be heightened by
the verbal reiteration of specific sums as suggested awards,
and even more so by placing such figures on a charf or black-
board so that they become fixed in the jury's mind. (However,
in the absence of the blackboard or chart, the jury may well be
permitted to take notes of any sums suggested by counsel.
Annot. 154 A.L.R. 878, 886 (1944)). The listing of these dan-
gers, however, is simply another way of stating in part what
has been stipulated-i.e., the speculative character of damages
in sueh a case. These are also dangers which can be minimized
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by at least three factors: (1) the argument of opposing
counsel, (2) the court's instuctions, and (3) the standard
procedural devices available to eliminate excessive verdicts-
e.g., putting the plaintiff on terms or the motion to set aside
the verdict. Finally, there is some inconsistency involved in
the view that the jury is entirely capable of awarding a fair
sum via compensation with no specific basis for arriving at
that sum, but at the same time incapable of appreciating the
relatively obvious dangers involved when a method of calcula-
tion is suggested so that arbitrary jury action might result.
If the jury can determine what is reasonable compensation
in a lump sum award, why can't they decide what is a reason-
able per diem award? Arguably, the. jurors may have a
better knowledge or awareness of the effect and power of
money over a shorter period of time. If this is so, the per
diem argument may contribute to a fairer verdict.
Finally, consider the argument that the compensation ar-
rived at under a per diem formula would be without evidence
to support it. In the first place, the same argument can be
made with reference to a compensation award arrived at as a
matter of conscience, hunch, instinct, or inspiration. Secondly,
in either case it is difficult to see that this criticism is justified
if there is evidence of the nature of the injury involved, the
prognosis, and, in an appropriate case, the life expectancy
of the party injured. All of these items of proof are "evi-
dence" on the damage problem under the present Virginia
rule which involves, perhaps, unspecified units or periods of
time but permits counsel to argue for a fixed sum via recov-
ery for the speculative items discussed here. The evidence
seems to be just as cogent, or perhaps more cogent, if dam-
ages could be calculated according to a per diem or similar
fixed basis procedure.
In a note titled Per Diem Damages Argument for Pain and
Suffering Approved in Personal Injury case, 33 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 214 (1960), the arguments against the per diem method
of computing damages are considered and rebutted. With
reference to the point under discussion, the author notes
that counsel's per diem argument is merely in the nature
PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGE ARGUMENTS 235
of a comment on evidence already introduced regarding pain
and suffering. Also it is noted that since the final award
must be in terms of money, and the plaintiff must be prepared
to argue that the verdict is consistent with the evidence, i.e.,
to be inferred from it, it follows inevitably that counsel must
have some way of showing that the money award is inferrable
from the evidence. The per diem formula is perhaps the
most rational way to do this. Wigmore has noted: "So long
as the law gives compensation in the shape of money, there
is an inconsistency in excluding estimates in money." 7 Wig-
more, Evidence §1944, at p. 56 (3d ed. 1940). If the estimate
can be given, the. argument for allowing proof of the method
of arriving at the estimate is almost overwhelming.
2. The per diem or other fixed basis for calculating dam-
ages by counsel in argument invades the province of the jury.
201 Va. 109, 115.
Two suggestions by way of noting the obvious can be made
here. This argument pressed too far logically would prohibit
any comment on the evidence by the plaintiff's lawyer. Sec-
ondly, the jury still retains the power and the duty to pass on
the evidence and to weigh the arguments of opposing counsel.
The suggestion that a given statement "invades the prov-
ince of the jury" or "usurps the function of the jury" is
normally made when the court is striking down the testimony
of a witness as an inadmissible statement of opinion. Indeed,
this ties in with the court's suggestion that to permit the
lawyer to argue per diem damages would be tantamount to
permitting him to testify as to the "value" of the injuries
sustained by his client-a statement of opinion which an
expert would not be permitted to make. (Ibid.) It is really
difficult to see just how the lawyer is testifying. here any more
than he would be testifying in performing the daily and neces-
sary tasks of arguing simply for a lump sum recovery where
damages are speculative, or arguing that the evidence does
or does not support a finding of any other fact. One of the
few situations in which this writer has had sympathy with
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the rejection of opinion testimony as invading the province
of the jury is the situation in which a witness offers to state
a conclusion as to legal consequences or result, assuming and
applying in his testimony some unexpressed legal principle
to a given factual situation. But even that difficulty is avoided
here where there simply is no rule of law as to damages other
than the rule that damages are to be determined by a jury in
the exercise of good conscience and discretion, if there is a
jury. Then, too, it would seem that a lawyer, in argument, is
necessarily forced time and again to contend for a conclusion
or verdict by urging a "legal result" or at least a result in-
volving the resolution of a mixed question of law and fact-
e.g., the argument on the issue of negligence. It is true that
there is at least one limitation recognized by some courts
which, presumably, the court will state to the jury in instruct-
ing on the issue of damages. This takes the form of the state-
ment that there is no market value for pain or suffering
and/or no "golden rule" applicable here. (E.g. Botta v. Brun-
ver, infra.) This rule, in practical application, prevents the
argument that damages should be determined by any juror's
asking himself what he would charge (or what any person
would charge) to undergo the same pain or disability. Good-
hart v. Pennsylvania. R. Co. 177 Pa. 1, 35 A. 191 (1896) ; 15 Am.
Jur., Damages § 72 (1938). As long as the lawyer in summa-
tion, avoids these suggestions or arguments, again, it is diffi-
cult to see that the per diem damage argument, or some
similar argument, invades the province of the jury in any
meaningful sense. It might also be noted in this connection,
that the jury can always reject or modify the award suggested
as a result of per diem calculations. In the Harrington case
this method of determining damages led to a suggested verdict
of $29,374.98 and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
in the amount of $12,500.00.
The Harrington decision poses certain practical problems.
One of the cases relied on in the opinion is Botta v. Brunner,
26 N.J. 82, 138 A. 2d 713, 60 A.L.R. 2d 1331 (1958). This de-
cision in turn leaned heavily on the Pennsylvania cases which
prohibit any mention to the jury of the amount sought to be
PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGE ARGUMENTS 237
recovered for such items as pain, mental anguish, or disabil-
ity. It is certainly not the apparent intention of the Virginia
court to adopt this radical departure from existing practice.
(However, the court relies on Botta v. Brunner, supra, which
adopts and applies the Pennsylvania rule in this respect and
also on Vaughan v. Magee, 218 F. 630, (3d Cir. 1914) which
applies the Pennsylvania rule in a diversity case and com-
mends the rule as a proper one.) It is also true that in a juris-
diction like Pennsylvania or New Jersey where the jury is
left uninformed as to the damages claimed, it follows very
easily that it would be improper for counsel to resort to a per
diem or fixed basis method of calculating damages in argu-
ment, particulary where the argument suggests a given sum
per unit of time by way of damages. Presumably, it is still
proper for the plaintiff's attorney in Virginia to state to the
jury the amount that he is seeking to recover for pain, suffer-
ing, mental anguish, and disability in addition to the special
damages shown. If this is true, can counsel introduce evidence
of plaintiff's life expectancy, say in a permanent disability
case, and emphasize such evidence in his argument. (E.g.,
"The plaintiff is going to have to live with this thing for 40
years!"). The Botta court cites with approval judicial lan-
guage permitting this practice. Could this evidence be noted
on a blackboard within the view of the jury? Logically, all of
this suggests a fixed method of calculating damages. If this
is permissible could counsel argue that this disability will
cause daily inconvenience, perhaps pointing out the number
of days involved in the life expectancy estimate but avoiding
any explicit suggestion as to the amount to be awarded for
each day? These various shadings in the approach to the
problem of arguing damages may well become a source of very
real difficulty to the practitioner, and, again, it is difficult
to see any substantial difference between the practice sug-
gested in these questions and the more detailed argument
in the Harrivgton decision. The problem of suggesting or
arguing specific amounts to be allowed for future hospitaliza-
tion and future medical expenses is still up in" the air.
Presumably evidence will normally be introduced as to these
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items and the Harrington decision does not single them out
for express condemnation. The doubt created lies partially
in the court's statement: "Most of the other items appearing
on the blackboard appear to have been supported by the
evidence. We find no error in using the blackboard to place
upon it figures which were supported by the evidence." 201
Va. 109, 115, 109 S.E. 2d 126, 131. (Emphasis added.) These,
too, are speculative items and again logically, in a given
case counsel's argument for a fixed figure as to these items
might meet all of the objections advanced by the Harrington
opinion with reference to the items singled out for discussion
there, although to a lesser degree. Such a result could come
close to placing a premium on the circumstance that a given
defendant managed to inflict damages necessarily conjectural
or speculative in amount. Cf. 15 Am. Jur. Damages §21
(1938).
In considering the practical consequences of the Harrington
case, it is important to emphasize that the conduct condemned
in this case was a method of computing damages--i.e., a sug-
gestion by counsel of a specific dollar value per hour, per
day, or per week, for pain and suffering. The court does
not forbid counsel to point out to the jury the duration of the
plaintiff's suffering as shown by the evidence (e.g., evidence
of life expectancy), or even to ask the jury to decide what,
in their judgment, would be fair compensation for that kind
of pain and suffering per hour, per day, etc. Nor does the
court condemn a reference to the ad damnum clause in the
pleadings whether or not such reference is coupled with
testimony as to the life expectancy of the injured plaintiff.
This latter testimony is just as cogent in a permanent injury
case as is proof of the nature of the plaintiff's injury, and
proof of the effects and results of such injury. Certainly
a description of the daily difficulties to be experienced by the
plaintiff would be proper. Proof of life expectancy is con-
sistent with the court's urging that the argument be sup-
ported by evidence, and the reference to the lump sum sought
for pain and suffering does not disturb the kind of vagueness
that the court apparently deems desirable in its effort to
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avoid misleading the jury. Of course, assuming that counsel
can still state to the jury the total amount sued for, then list
his special damages, and then argue for an allowance for pain
and suffering, simple and readily self-suggested subtraction
inevitably tells the jury what lump sum is being included for
this last item of damages. The Botta case is cited by Har-
rington only for its condemnation and rejection of the use of
an explicit per diem formula.
It may be that some help on these practical questions is held
out in a New Jersey case (decided in the Superior Court,
Appellate Division) succeeding the Botta decision. This is
Cross v. Robert E. Lamb, Inc., 60 N. J. Super. 53, 158 A. 2d
359. This was an action by a welder to recover for personal
injuries sustained while working on his job. The defendant
general contractor appealed from an $80,000.00 verdict (which
had been reduced from $110,000.00). In his damage argu-
ments, the plaintiff's lawyer used the blackboard to show P's
life expectancy broken down into years, weeks, and days; to
show his expected normal retirement age of 65, to itemize
medical expenses and lost wages for 142 days, to note a
damage item of pain and suffering to the present of 485 days,
to note "pain and suffering for rest of life-one lump sum;"
and finally, to compute in four different ways probable loss
of future wages. These last amounts were calculated on the
assumptions: (1) Plaintiff might stop work at 65. (2) P
might stop work at 71 (life expectancy). (3) P's earnings
might be reduced to $2.50 per hour instead of $4.25. (4) P's
earnings might be reduced to $2.75 per hour instead of $4.25.
There was evidence that at the time of the trial P still
earned $4.25 per hour. The court allowed the mention of
pain and suffering and then stated at pp. 371, 372:
To minimize the possibility of prejudice the jury should
be given to understand by the court as well as counsel
that the figures written on the board are not evidence.
... In the same vein, the blackboard should be under view
by the jury only during the argument in which counsel
who has written the figures is discussing damages..
With these general principles as background, we turn to
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the argument and blackboard entries made by plaintiff's
counsel here. We observe, preliminarily, that we find
nothing prejudicial insofar as the references to pain and
suffering are concerned, notwithstanding defendant's
argument tQ the contrary. No figures were suggested,
either by unit or in total, for pain and suffering. If the
effect of some of the notations was to remind the jury
that plaintiff had suffered during the 485 days since the
accident, this was a fact proven by the evidence, and it
was also inferable from the proofs that he would have
pain for the remainder of his life. The life expectancy
of 30.29 years was taken from the table of mortality in-
corporated in the rules of court, and both plaintiff's
counsel and the court told the jury that the table was only
a general guide based upon average expectations and
might or might not turn out to be true in plaintiff's case,
and that the jury might exercise its own judgment in this
respect .... Since the jury properly had the plaintiff's
life expectancy of 30.29 years before it there was no
prejudicial effect in its being apprised by counsel what
it could have calculated for itself-that this was equal to1,575 weeks and 11,000 days. We find no merit in the
argument that this connoted to the jury that it should
determine its award for pain and suffering by first arriv-ing at a daily or weekly unit of damage for that item and
then multiplying it by the number of days or weeks of
the period."
This language of course appears in a context where it
would be improper to tell the jury the amount demanded for
pain and suffering. There is no statement in Harrington
which prevents the addition of this information in lump sum
forim in argument to the jury.
The court went on to hold that counsel's figures as to loss
of future earnings were simply not supported by evidence or
accompanying instructions that counsel's formulae and fig-
ures here did not constitute evidence. However, as to this
item, the court stated at page 373:
We do not suggest that there are no situations at allin which the general formula approach to argument of
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lost future wages, with or without use of a blackboard,
could properly be employed. As in trial practice gen-
erally, a broad discretionary area reposes with the trial
judge.
Each case, of course, hinges on its facts. It is my own hope
that Harrington may be modified in a ease in which, along
with proper instructions to the jury which we have noted, the
fixed formula argument as to future damages (including pain
and suffering) is supported by the strongest and best evidence
that the nature of the case allows. The problem of proof, the
insufficiency of supporting evidence, may have been the
Achilles heel that brought about the Harrington case. If so,
supplying proof, for example by use of mortality tables, ac-
companied by a careful effort to avoid overlapping claims
may serve as a basis for distinguishing the Harrington case
at some future date.
As might be suspected by now this note does not purport
to be an exhaustive exploration of the cases pro and con on
our problem. Reference can be made to the citations listed in
the Harrington case and particularly to the cases collected in
Annot. 60 A.L.R. 2d 1331 (1958), to Botta v. Brunner, supra,
and to Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959), a leading
decision contra to Harrington which cites authorities and
notes the arguments both ways. The cases are divided.
